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Pessimistic Fallibilism and Cognitive Vulnerability: Richard Rorty as an Example.
- Source :
- European Journal of Pragmatism & American Philosophy; 2020, Vol. 12 Issue 1, p1-18, 18p
- Publication Year :
- 2020
-
Abstract
- In this text, the relationship between fallibilism and cognitive vulnerability is examined using Richard Rorty's thinking as an example. First, some of Rorty's central ideas are collected and commented on, especially the substitution of objectivity for solidarity, since it affects relevant issues of epistemology and of reflection on rationality. Next, the notions of fallibilism and cognitive vulnerability are examined, which will be connected to an existential dimension of vulnerability. Examples of all those things are also given from Rorty's thinking and it is highlighted that the author operates with both a negative and a positive sense of existential vulnerability. It is then stated that Rorty's proposal implies pessimistic fallibilism and an excess of cognitive vulnerability. First, it is argued that the cause of this lies in the fact that his approach is imprisoned in what Richard Bernstein called Cartesian anxiety and secondly, this generates unwanted consequences for the Rortyan goals themselves to raise his ethnocentric proposal as a non-relativistic alternative to realism and authoritarianism. In this respect, it is maintained that the priority that Rorty attributes to solidarity is accompanied by the rejection of any notion of evidence. This produces a conceptual lacuna in the structure of his thought that makes it impossible to reflect philosophically on an epistemic activity (the activity of adducing or requesting evidence) that is a normal part of day-to-day conversational exchanges as important as controversies to determine the best option in each case. In response, we will argue that one can better work towards the achievement of Rortyan goals if we bear in mind that reasons based on solidarity do not replace and do not deactivate the value of epistemic reasons, although they do combine and reinforce each other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 20364091
- Volume :
- 12
- Issue :
- 1
- Database :
- Complementary Index
- Journal :
- European Journal of Pragmatism & American Philosophy
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 144223438
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.4000/ejpap.1862