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Requirements of intention in light of belief.
- Source :
- Philosophical Studies; Sep2020, Vol. 177 Issue 9, p2471-2492, 22p
- Publication Year :
- 2020
-
Abstract
- Much work in the philosophy of action in the last few decades has focused on the elucidation and justification of a series of purported norms of practical rationality that concern the presence or absence of intention in light of belief, and that demand a kind of structural coherence in the psychology of an agent. Examples of such norms (all roughly formulated) include: Intention Detachment, which proscribes intending to do something in case some condition obtains, believing that such condition obtains, and not intending to do that thing; Intention-Belief Consistency, which proscribes intending to do what you believe you will not do; Intention Consistency, which proscribes intending each of two ends you believe to be inconsistent; and Means-End Coherence, which proscribes intending an end and not intending the means you believe to be implied by your end. In this paper, I present a series of examples that show that these requirements are not genuine requirements of rationality. The reason for this is simple: these requirements concern the presence or absence of intention in light of all-out belief. Rational agents like us, however, do not, and in fact should not, always form or revise their intentions in light of what they all-out believe. When such agents do not form or revise their intentions in light of what they all-out believe, they need not be irrational if they do not conform to these requirements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Subjects :
- JUSTIFICATION (Ethics)
PSYCHOLOGY
PRACTICAL reason
LEGAL liability
THEORISTS
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 00318116
- Volume :
- 177
- Issue :
- 9
- Database :
- Complementary Index
- Journal :
- Philosophical Studies
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 144642689
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01321-0