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Simple bets to elicit private signals.
- Source :
- Theoretical Economics; Jul2021, Vol. 16 Issue 3, p777-797, 21p
- Publication Year :
- 2021
-
Abstract
- This paper introduces two simple betting mechanisms—top‐flop and threshold betting—to elicit unverifiable information from crowds. Agents are offered bets on the rating of an item about which they received a private signal versus that of a random item. We characterize conditions for the chosen bet to reveal the agents' private signal even if the underlying ratings are biased. We further provide microeconomic foundations of the ratings, which are endogenously determined by the actions of other agents in a game setting. Our mechanisms relax standard assumptions of the literature, such as common prior, and homogeneous and risk neutral agents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Subjects :
- CROWDS
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 15557561
- Volume :
- 16
- Issue :
- 3
- Database :
- Complementary Index
- Journal :
- Theoretical Economics
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 151582316
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.3982/TE4343