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Must We Love Epistemic Goods?
- Source :
- Philosophical Quarterly; Oct2021, Vol. 71 Issue 4, p1-22, 22p
- Publication Year :
- 2021
-
Abstract
- It is widely held that for an agent to have any intellectual character virtues, they must be fundamentally motivated by a love of epistemic goods. In this paper, I challenge this 'strong motivational requirement' on virtue. First, I call into question three key reasons offered in its defence: that a love of epistemic goods is needed to explain the scope , the performance quality , or the value of virtue. Secondly, I highlight several costs and restrictions that we incur from its acceptance. In so doing, I show that my titular question is more than just a question about the nature of virtuous motivation or the structure of intellectual virtue. Ultimately, it is a question about the very function of virtue epistemology itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Subjects :
- EPISTEMIC logic
VIRTUE
CHARACTER
THEORY of knowledge
MOTIVATION (Psychology)
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 00318094
- Volume :
- 71
- Issue :
- 4
- Database :
- Complementary Index
- Journal :
- Philosophical Quarterly
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 153655855
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqaa072