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A social ontology of "maximal" persons.
- Source :
- Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour; Mar2022, Vol. 52 Issue 1, p147-163, 17p
- Publication Year :
- 2022
-
Abstract
- In this paper, I address a range of arguments put forward by Kwame Gyekye (1992) and Bernard Matolino (2014) denying Menkiti's twin propositions that persons differ ontologically from human beings and that human attitudes, behaviours and practices constitute persons in social reality. They argue that his account of "maximal" persons, rooted in African traditional thought‐worlds, conflates issues and ultimately involve him in a category mistake. I argue that their arguments do not succeed, and that Menkiti's view is not in any predicament because of them. Then, I draw on John Searle's account of social ontology to clarify the sense in which attitudes, behaviours and practices are constituents of persons. Thus, I characterise persons as social entities belonging in a social ontology. Finally, I argue that realism regarding persons is not undermined by the threat of conventionalism lurking behind the view. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Subjects :
- SOCIAL belonging
ONTOLOGY
CONSTITUENTS (Persons)
SOCIAL reality
HUMAN beings
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 00218308
- Volume :
- 52
- Issue :
- 1
- Database :
- Complementary Index
- Journal :
- Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 155808401
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1111/jtsb.12312