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In Defence of Non-Ideal Political Deference.
- Source :
- Episteme (Cambridge University Press); Jun2022, Vol. 19 Issue 2, p264-285, 22p
- Publication Year :
- 2022
-
Abstract
- Many philosophers have claimed that relying on the testimony of others in normative questions is in some way problematic. In this paper, I consider whether we should be troubled by deference in democratic politics. I argue that (i) deference is less problematic in impure cases of political deference, and (ii) most non-ideal cases of political deference are impure. To establish the second point, I rely on empirical research from political psychology. I also outline two principled reasons why we should expect political deference to be untroubling: political problems are difficult and require a division of epistemic labour; furthermore, there is value in exercising epistemic solidarity with those one shares an identity or interests with. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Subjects :
- RESPECT
POLITICAL psychology
PHILOSOPHERS
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 17423600
- Volume :
- 19
- Issue :
- 2
- Database :
- Complementary Index
- Journal :
- Episteme (Cambridge University Press)
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 156738922
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2020.26