Why immanent critique?

This article defends the principle, central to the Frankfurt School tradition of critical social theory, that social criticism should rely only on normative criteria that are "immanent" to the society under evaluation. My argument turns on the claim that a normative theory can have a practical aim that places legitimate constraints on its contents. For example, since the aim of advice is to contribute to the advisee's deliberation about what to do, a judgment about what someone should do is good advice only if that person could take it up in her own deliberation. I argue that there is a valuable kind of social criticism analogous to advice, which aims to contribute to the reflection of members of society on how to orient themselves practically to their social world. Drawing on the work of Bernard Williams, I suggest that concrete normative ideals can be so permeated by the needs, social relations, and concepts of one society that they are not real options in a sufficiently different social milieu. Because such criteria cannot serve as a genuine basis for practical orientation to the social world, they are ineligible for use in social criticism of this kind. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]