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Doxastic justification through dispositions to cause.

Authors :
Schönherr, Julius
Source :
Synthese; Aug2022, Vol. 200 Issue 4, p1-22, 22p
Publication Year :
2022

Abstract

According to the standard view, a belief is based on a reason and doxastically justified—i.e., permissibly held—only if a causal relation obtains between a reason and the belief. In this paper, I argue that a belief can be doxastically justified by a reason’s mere disposition to sustain it. Such a disposition, however, wouldn’t establish a causal connection unless it were manifested. My argument is that, in the cases I have in mind, the manifestation of this disposition would add no positive epistemic feature to the belief: a belief that is justified after the manifestation of a reason’s causal powers must have already been justified before their manifestation. As a result, those who adhere to the standard causal view of the basing relation face a hard choice: they should either abandon the enormously popular view that doxastic justification has a basing requirement or modify their view of the basing relation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Details

Language :
English
ISSN :
00397857
Volume :
200
Issue :
4
Database :
Complementary Index
Journal :
Synthese
Publication Type :
Academic Journal
Accession number :
158130862
Full Text :
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03800-0