A Study of the Strategic Interaction in Environmental Regulation Based on Spatial Effects.

The incomplete enforcement of environmental regulations in China is a serious issue in environmental protection affairs, and this paper attempts to provide a new explanation for its prevalence from the perspective of strategic interaction. Under Chinese decentralization, environmental regulations are seen by local governments as a tool to compete for scarce resources, which leads to strategic interactions between regions. Therefore, under the theoretical framework of regional policy spillovers, this paper examines the strategic interaction behavior of local governments in environmental regulation with a spatial econometric approach research methodology based on panel data of 29 Chinese provinces (autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the central government) from 2015 to 2019, taking spatial interdependence and the strategic interaction relationship of local governments as the entry point. The study finds that the intensity of environmental regulation in a region is not only related to the characteristics of the region, but also related to the intensity of environmental regulation in competing provinces, and there is a significant strategic interaction of environmental regulation behavior between regions, which is manifested as complementary spatial strategies. If the neighboring provinces invest more in environmental regulation, the region will also strengthen its level of environmental regulation accordingly, showing the contagiousness of non-complete enforcement of environmental regulation. At the same time, the complementary strategic interaction behavior of environmental regulation between regions has weakened since 2017, which highlights the role of green environmental performance assessment. Based on this, this paper proposes to provide a policy reference to avoid the environmental regulation enforcement dilemma. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]