Blockchain Operations in the Presence of Security Concerns.

Problem definition: A blockchain payment system, such as Bitcoin or Ethereum, validates electronic transactions and stores them in a chain of blocks without a central authority. Miners with computing power compete for the rights to create blocks according to a preset protocol, referred to as hashing or mining, and, in return, earn fees paid by users who submit transactions. Because of security concerns caused by decentralization, a transaction is confirmed after a number of additional blocks are subsequently extended to the block containing it. This confirmation latency introduces an intricate interplay between miners and users. This paper provides approximate system equilibria and studies optimal designs of a blockchain. Methodology/results: The hashing process is essentially a single-server queue with batch services based on a fee-based priority discipline, and confirmation latency adds complexity to the equilibrium behavior and optimal design. We analyze how miners' participation decisions interact with users' participation and fee decisions and identify optimal designs when the goal is to maximize the throughput or social welfare. We validate our model and conduct numerical studies using data from Bitcoin. Managerial implications: By incorporating security issues, we uncover the interdependence of the decisions between users and miners and the driver for nonzero entrance fees in practice. We show that miners and users may end up in either a vicious or virtuous cycle, depending on the initial system state. By allowing the entrance fee to be a design parameter, we are able to establish that it is optimal to simply run a blockchain system at its full capacity and a block size as small as possible. Funding: This work was supported by the Hong Kong Research Grants Council [Grants 16200019, 16200617, 16200821, 16208120, and 16214121]. Supplemental Material: The e-companion is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2023.1197. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]