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Norms2: Norms About Norms.
- Source :
- Erkenntnis; Aug2023, Vol. 88 Issue 6, p2673-2694, 22p
- Publication Year :
- 2023
-
Abstract
- In this paper, I outline and defend the view that variations in compliance levels with one and the same norm represent different norms about following norms. In support of this claim, I first argue that classic game-theoretic accounts, which define norms as Nash equilibria of noncooperative games, typically consider variations in compliance levels as separate norms. After that, I suggest a more fine-grained, game-theoretic distinction that accounts for degrees of compliance with the same norm and I show how to incorporate such an account into a psychological framework. Finally, the paper examines what given degrees of compliance can reveal about the dynamics underlying the process of norm change. I will argue that they are indicators of different reactions to the introduction of new norms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Subjects :
- NASH equilibrium
SOCIAL change
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 01650106
- Volume :
- 88
- Issue :
- 6
- Database :
- Complementary Index
- Journal :
- Erkenntnis
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 164579331
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-021-00472-z