The guest: A-human ontology and Tarkovsky's Solaris.

This article covers the ontologico-theoretical groundwork of Andrei Tarkovsky's film Solaris, articulating the meanings behind the assignment of specific states of being. Following – and ultimately, upending – the philosophical questions of Martin Heidegger, the article analyzes the shifts present in the characters of the film, as their respective existences reside under differentiated statuses. In addition, the author brings about a new term, furthering Heidegger's ideas on the nonhuman, called the ohne-Lebenden, which predicates an intermediary space between dasein and thing as a being that exhibits a questioning about its own existence, yet is solely in the grasp of the ontological Being that dictates it. The article weaves through these Heideggerian concepts, bringing in examples from Tarkovsky's film to elucidate the main question: what does it mean to "have life" as a human being? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]