Groping Toward Synthesis? A Fresh Approach to Deterrence Theory.

The article comments on article of Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein entitled "Beyond Deterrence," which is about the theory of deterrence and nuclear arms race between the United States and Soviet Union. The authors described detailed studies of many significant cases in which deterrence failed, as a scholarly and political warning against naive and dangerous models of interaction between states. It is noteworthy that they begin this article with a discussion of their own biases against deterrence and later also try to reintegrate some of the traditional logic. There is a need to be very careful in our defining "deterrence success." There exist a tendency to underestimate the possibility of defensive motives on the side of the challenger and the limitation of his challenge and also the contribution of previous actions by the alleged defender to the provocation of the challenge, both in crises of deterrence and in long-term deterrence relationships. And also underestimate the weight of political as compared to military factors. The authors do not distinguish clearly enough between the relevance of deterrence and the causes of failure. It is important to first distinguish acts of deterrence, direct political and military threats in a political crisis and a deterrence system, the relations in which the political, psychological, and material apparatus of deterrence forms an important part of the conflict structure.