Is Intentionality Dependent upon Consciousness?

It is often assumed that consciousness and intentionality are two mutually independent aspects of mental life. When the assumption is denounced, it usually gives way to the claim that consciousness is somehow dependent upon intentionality. The possibility that intentionality may be dependent upon consciousness is rarely entertained. Recently, however, John Searle and Colin McGinn have argued for just such dependence. In this paper, I reconstruct and evaluate their argumentation. I am in sympathy both with their view and with the lines of argument they employ in its defense. Unlike Searle and McGinn, however, I am quite attached to a naturalist approach to intentionality. It will turn out to be somewhat difficult to reconcile naturalism with the notion that intentionality is dependent upon consciousness, although, perhaps surprisingly, I will argue that McGinn's case for such dependence is compatible with naturalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]