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Defending Against Membership Inference Attacks on Beacon Services.
- Source :
- ACM Transactions on Privacy & Security; Aug2023, Vol. 26 Issue 3, p1-32, 32p
- Publication Year :
- 2023
-
Abstract
- Large genomic datasets are created through numerous activities, including recreational genealogical investigations, biomedical research, and clinical care. At the same time, genomic data has become valuable for reuse beyond their initial point of collection, but privacy concerns often hinder access. Beacon services have emerged to broaden accessibility to such data. These services enable users to query for the presence of a particular minor allele in a dataset, and information helps care providers determine if genomic variation is spurious or has some known clinical indication. However, various studies have shown that this process can leak information regarding if individuals are members of the underlying dataset. There are various approaches to mitigate this vulnerability, but they are limited in that they (1) typically rely on heuristics to add noise to the Beacon responses; (2) offer probabilistic privacy guarantees only, neglecting data utility; and (3) assume a batch setting where all queries arrive at once. In this article, we present a novel algorithmic framework to ensure privacy in a Beacon service setting with a minimal number of query response flips. We represent this problem as one of combinatorial optimization in both the batch setting and the online setting (where queries arrive sequentially). We introduce principled algorithms with both privacy and, in some cases, worstcase utility guarantees. Moreover, through extensive experiments, we show that the proposed approaches significantly outperform the state of the art in terms of privacy and utility, using a dataset consisting of 800 individuals and 1.3 million single nucleotide variants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 24712566
- Volume :
- 26
- Issue :
- 3
- Database :
- Complementary Index
- Journal :
- ACM Transactions on Privacy & Security
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 170017052
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1145/3603627