Promoting green development of agriculture based on low-carbon policies and green preferences: an evolutionary game analysis.

Facilitating agro-food green planting and consumption is an effective way to reduce carbon emissions and achieve sustainability in global agriculture. Although many researchers have explored and analyzed this issue, there remains a gap between stakeholders of green agricultural development combined with low-carbon policies and green preferences that have been overlooked. To bridge this gap, a three-party evolutionary game model consisting of farmers, governments, and consumers is developed based on the government's low-carbon policies and stakeholders' green preferences. The six key parameters based on low-carbon policies and green preferences influencing strategic behavior are thoroughly discussed using numerical simulations. The findings reveal the following: (1) Appropriate subsidies policy and relatively high carbon prices are conducive to promoting agro-food green planting. (2) The three parties' green preferences improve people's low-carbon awareness in the market. (3) When the governments' green preference coefficient is less than 1, they will choose positive regulation and enhance farmers' and consumers' green preferences through publicity and education. As farmers' and consumers' green preferences increase to a certain high level, governments choosing negative regulation can also reach an advanced evolutionary stable strategy. The results provide theoretical and practical guidance for the green development of agriculture, help governments formulate scientific low-carbon policies, and provide referential significance for improving the green preference of farmers and consumers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]