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Three-Party Evolutionary Game Analysis of IoT Platform Knowledge Hiding Under Organization Participation from the Perspective of Stakeholders.
- Source :
- Journal of Circuits, Systems & Computers; 5/15/2024, Vol. 33 Issue 7, p1-22, 22p
- Publication Year :
- 2024
-
Abstract
- The 21st century is an era of rapid development of high-tech industry. Through continuous collection and sharing of data, IoT technology connected by things has penetrated into every aspect of human life. Modern organizations find that they increasingly rely on knowledge and information sharing and interconnection to enhance their innovation and development capabilities. Therefore, this paper studies the strategic decision-making of knowledge sharing among employees on the IoT platform drawing on evolutionary game theory, this paper constructs a three-party game model composed of "organization-knowledge sharers-knowledge seekers" from the perspective of stakeholders, and discusses the strategic choice of organization and employee behavior under the dynamic decision mechanism and when the game reaches equilibrium and stability. Moreover, this paper uses MATLAB 2016a to simulate the model. The results show that under the premise of higher organizational rewards, synergistic benefits, high-shared extra income, knowledge-sharing preferences, incentive preferences of the organization, the system is easier to reach the ideal state. With the smaller cost of sharing and incentive, organization and employees are more willing to be motivators and sharers, while the incentive degree of organization should be controlled within a reasonable range. This paper can provide specific theoretical and practical guidance for the practice of organizational knowledge management. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 02181266
- Volume :
- 33
- Issue :
- 7
- Database :
- Complementary Index
- Journal :
- Journal of Circuits, Systems & Computers
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 176812612
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1142/S0218126624501329