Regime uncertainty, democratic erosion and resilience, and Turkish opposition actors.

Which peculiar uncertainties does democratic erosion (DE) pose to opposition actors? How have these uncertainties influenced the behavior of opposition actors during Turkey's autocratization since the early 2000s? What can we learn from this case regarding the links between DE and opposition behavior? The latter should be treated as an integral part of explaining DE—the gradual decline in the quality of multiple aspects of democracy under popularly elected governments. We argue that a contextual uncertainty, "regime uncertainty" (RU) challenged Turkish opposition actors, compounding the other and related uncertainties they faced such as institutional and strategic uncertainties and affecting their resilience against DE. RU concerns the ambivalence that DE's inherent qualities generate about what the regime is, or is becoming. The resulting intra-opposition divisions and indecisions raise the question of whether the primary context, frame and end of opposition politics should be issue- and party-based competitive politics or defending democracy against an imminent threat. Hence, RU generates recurring rifts over "normal" versus "extraordinary" politics. We analyze the Turkish experience and intra-opposition politics in four sub-periods (nascent DE, consolidation of erosive power, advanced DE, breakdown and post-breakdown opposition experimentation). Turkish opposition actors' RU perceptions and resulting behaviors evolved on highly non-linear paths. We offer novel analytical/theoretical tools and argue that the agency and capacity of oppositions to overcome RU in a country, alongside their ability to surmount other challenges, should be considered an integral part of democratic resilience against erosion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]