The co-determination decision game with consumption externalities.

This work aims to investigate the effects of co-determination in a game-theoretic setting by considering network externalities in consumption. The received theoretical literature, so far focused only on standard (non-network) industries, showed that co-determination might emerge as the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of a non-cooperative Cournot duopoly, but this outcome generates a prisoner's dilemma. The present research shows that (positive) network externalities may solve the prisoner's dilemma and let co-determination become a Pareto-efficient SPNE with homogeneous or heterogeneous products. In a network industry, co-determination becomes a Pareto-superior institution for society, as firms, consumers and workers are better off than under profit maximisation. These results hold for exogenous (homogeneous and heterogeneous) co-determination and endogenous co-determination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]