Research on dynamic game operation behavior of multi‐oligopoly car‐sharing operators considering off‐peak pricing factors.

In the practical evolution of shared vehicle systems, numerous societal factors come into play, such as inadequate parking infrastructure, battery capacity, and the budget for technological improvement. This study integrates the operational realities of shared vehicle systems with governmental carbon emission reduction policies and "double control" initiatives. Considering various perturbations, the paper constructs a Stackelberg short‐term model among diverse oligopolistic shared vehicle operators with technique sharing. It also develops a long‐term repeated game framework to scrutinize the impact of pertinent parameters on operators' decision variables and profits, along with system stability and complexity. The findings, elucidated through numerical analyses, reveal that the burgeoning sensitivity of users to energy conservation augments the overall shared vehicle market. The technique sharing mechanism boosts the benefit of the whole group of shared vehicle operators while diminishing the start‐up operators' revenue. In the long term, however, excessive price adjustments by SEV operators may lead to market chaos and profit erosion. Conversely, enhancing the adjustment coefficient of technological level levels by start‐up SEV2 operators may result solely in their own decision‐making becoming unmanageable. Finally, we found that both the methods of external force feedback control and parameter control are effective in restoring the chaotic market to stability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]