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Barriers to competition and the effect on political shirking: 1953–1992.
- Source :
- Public Choice; Mar2006, Vol. 126 Issue 3/4, p297-315, 19p, 9 Charts
- Publication Year :
- 2006
-
Abstract
- Economists and political scientists have offered a variety of explanations for why legislators might rationally choose to ignore the preferences of their constituents, political parties, and presidents. The broad conclusion of this literature is that there is an element of “shirking” in congressional voting. The objective of this paper is to suggest that the effects of shirking in congressional voting may have increased over time, largely in response to the raising of barriers to competition in congressional elections, thereby enabling legislators to vote their own preferences without fear of losing reelection. We use a quasi-experimental design that controls for the effects of party, region, electoral safety, presidential control of the White House, and constituency factors, in isolating the causal effects of barriers to entry on a continuous series of roll-calls regarding the raising of the debt limit between 1953 and 1992. We find that “shirking” in legislative voting on debt limit legislation is a post-1970s phenomenon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Subjects :
- VOTING
LEGISLATORS
POLITICAL parties
ELECTIONS
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 00485829
- Volume :
- 126
- Issue :
- 3/4
- Database :
- Complementary Index
- Journal :
- Public Choice
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 20348970
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-006-6829-x