US Presidential popularity and opportunities to coerce North Korea: a quantitative test 1990-2000.

This paper investigates how North Korean behaviour towards both the United States and South Korea is influenced by the popularity of the American President. The study applies theories relating to strategic conflict avoidance and signalling to suggest that the American President is able to demonstrate a willingness to use force when he is unpopular and as such is better able to coerce Pyongyang. Using a time-series model, I demonstrate that the North Koreans become more cooperative towards the United States in response to decreases in presidential popularity and increasing levels of US inflation. However, the study also shows that the North Koreans do not alter their behaviour towards the South Koreans in response to low American President Popularity ratings. The research, therefore, suggests that the North Koreans believe that the United States would be unable to launch a diversionary attack in response to North Korean behaviour towards the South. This study provides a clear support for the strategic avoidance of conflict hypothesis and suggests that the American Presidents are best able to coerce North Korea when they are unpopular at home. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]