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Bayesian Confirmation by Uncertain Evidence: A Reply to Huber [2005].
- Source :
- British Journal for the Philosophy of Science; Jun2008, Vol. 59 Issue 2, p201-211, 11p
- Publication Year :
- 2008
-
Abstract
- Bayesian epistemology postulates a probabilistic analysis of many sorts of ordinary and scientific reasoning. Huber ([2005]) has provided a novel criticism of Bayesianism, whose core argument involves a challenging issue: confirmation by uncertain evidence. In this paper, we argue that under a properly defined Bayesian account of confirmation by uncertain evidence, Huber's criticism fails. By contrast, our discussion will highlight what we take as some new and appealing features of Bayesian confirmation theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 00070882
- Volume :
- 59
- Issue :
- 2
- Database :
- Complementary Index
- Journal :
- British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 32791233
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axn008