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Deontological Restrictions and the Self/Other Asymmetry.
- Source :
- Nous; Dec2008, Vol. 42 Issue 4, p642-672, 31p
- Publication Year :
- 2008
-
Abstract
- This paper offers a partial justification of so-called “deontological restrictions.” Specifically it defends the “self/other asymmetry,” that we are morally obligated to treat our own agency, and thus its results, as specially important. The argument rests on a picture of moral obligation of a broadly Kantian sort. In particular, it rests on the basic normative assumption that our fundamental obligations are determined by the principles which a rational being as such would follow. These include principles which it is not essential for rational beings to accept, but acceptance of which we could non-arbitrarily attribute to them simply in their capacity as rational. Among these principles is the asymmetry mentioned above. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Subjects :
- DUTY
JUSTIFICATION (Ethics)
ETHICS
AGENT (Philosophy)
PHILOSOPHY
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 00294624
- Volume :
- 42
- Issue :
- 4
- Database :
- Complementary Index
- Journal :
- Nous
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 35481616
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2008.00695.x