MUNICIPAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: A MODEL AND ANALYSIS OF BARGAINING OUTCOMES.

This paper reports the result of an attempt to formulate and operationalize a model of collective bargaining outcomes. We have presented a number of conceptual and methodological departures from previous efforts to develop theoretical models of bargaining that treat outcomes as the central dependent variable. Our analysis in no way constitutes a pure test of our model. Rather, the task of developing a formal model of bargaining outcomes and weighing the relative importance of alternative sources of power in bargaining has just begun. We nevertheless feel our framework provides a theoretically and operationally useful guide for further research in this area. Many more problems for future research remain to be addressed. Several questions relate to the independent variables. For example, to what extent have we captured the relevant components or sources of power? More importantly, to what extent are the components or sources of power identified here generalizable to other bargaining relationships? Several important questions regarding measurement of the dependent variable might be addressed in future research. For example, do the various independent variables have differential impacts on different bargaining outcomes? One might hypothesize, for example, that if one could distinguish between distributive and integrative bargaining issues, one might expect differences in the impact of various independent variables on these two sets of outcomes. Likewise, the distinction between wage or compensation outcomes and other contract terms might be influenced by some sources of power more than others. Finally, the outcome measure used here is measured at one point in time, but reflects the accumulated outcomes of all previous bargains between the parties. An important issue for future research, therefore, is the extent to which this type of model is capable of predicting the changes in the terms of a contract that occur in any single round of negotiations. These are all questions that require further research. In general, we hope that this exercise demonstrates the feasibility of developing theoretical models of collective bargaining that are amenable to empirical analysis and that incorporate the key institutional aspects of the process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]