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The Strategic Role of Debt in Takeover Contests.

Authors :
Chowdhry, Bhagwan
Nanda, Vikram
Source :
Journal of Finance (Wiley-Blackwell); Jun93, Vol. 48 Issue 2, p731-745, 15p
Publication Year :
1993

Abstract

In a takeover contest, the presence of bidders' existing debtholders, if they can be expropriated by issuing new debt with equal or senior priority, allows bidders to commit to bid more than their valuation of the target. Such commitment can be beneficial because it deters potential entry by subsequent bidders and may allow a first bidder to acquire the target at a bargain price. The cost is that if entry by subsequent bidders does nevertheless take place, because the first bidder has committed himself to bid high premia, a bidding war ensues resulting in offers that may involve excessive premia, i.e., bids that are larger than the bidders' valuation of the target. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Details

Language :
English
ISSN :
00221082
Volume :
48
Issue :
2
Database :
Complementary Index
Journal :
Journal of Finance (Wiley-Blackwell)
Publication Type :
Academic Journal
Accession number :
4653168
Full Text :
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04736.x