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A Metamodel of the Oil Game under Climate Treaties.
- Source :
- INFOR; Nov2010, Vol. 48 Issue 4, p215-228, 14p, 2 Diagrams, 15 Charts, 4 Graphs
- Publication Year :
- 2010
-
Abstract
- A climate treaty like the one which should replace the Kyoto Protocol after 2012, may have important impacts on the oil, gas and coal markets. The full impact of such a treaty will not be felt before 2030. In this paper one uses a computable general equilibrium model as a simulator of the world economy to obtain a description of the demand laws for oil, gas and coal in a period centered in 2030. One then uses a hierarchical game à la Stackelberg where OPEC is a price fixing leader and a competitive fringe replies competitively according to a supply-demand equilibrium for the three competitive energy forms, oil, gas and coal. This permits one to assess the possible power of OPEC to counteract the effect of a world tax on carbon content. One shows the possible effect on oil price, OPEC wealth or market share, and global emissions reduction achieved for different tax levels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 03155986
- Volume :
- 48
- Issue :
- 4
- Database :
- Complementary Index
- Journal :
- INFOR
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 59912411
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.3138/infor.48.4.215