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Varieties of Subnational Undemocratic Regimes: Evidence from Argentina and Mexico.

Authors :
Giraudy, Agustina
Source :
Studies in Comparative International Development; Mar2013, Vol. 48 Issue 1, p51-80, 30p, 4 Diagrams, 5 Charts, 3 Graphs
Publication Year :
2013

Abstract

This article analyzes concept formation and its empirical and theoretical implications for the study of subnational undemocratic regimes. The paper argues that extant conceptualizations of subnational political regimes, which generally draw on a strategy of 'conceptual expansion' have important drawbacks for the study of subnational undemocratic regimes (SURs). To overcome these shortcomings, the article claims for a strategy of 'conceptual separation' that disaggregates political regimes into two orthogonal dimensions, i.e., the access to and the exercise of state power. Drawing on original evidence from Argentina and Mexico, the article demonstrates that the strategy of conceptual separation helps researchers to (1) avoid truncation of the universe of cases for analysis, (2) obtain new and more precise information about the actual magnitude of the uneven territorialization of democracy, (3) recognize the existence of two ideal type domains of SURs: patrimonial and bureaucratic, and (4) gain more analytic leverage to identify the causal mechanisms that explain regime continuity within and across SUR types. In-depth case studies of the state of Puebla (Mexico) and the province of San Luis (Argentina) demonstrate empirically the workings of the mechanisms that account for regime continuity in bureaucratic-like SURs. The article also demonstrates the potential of distinguishing between SUR types for the study of SUR origins and SUR change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Details

Language :
English
ISSN :
00393606
Volume :
48
Issue :
1
Database :
Complementary Index
Journal :
Studies in Comparative International Development
Publication Type :
Academic Journal
Accession number :
85399602
Full Text :
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12116-012-9117-4