Cite
Inefficient Results in the Market for Corporate Control: Highest Bidders, Highest-Value Users, and Socially Optimal Owners.
MLA
Miller, Robert T. “Inefficient Results in the Market for Corporate Control: Highest Bidders, Highest-Value Users, and Socially Optimal Owners.” Journal of Corporation Law, vol. 39, no. 1, Fall 2013, pp. 71–128. EBSCOhost, widgets.ebscohost.com/prod/customlink/proxify/proxify.php?count=1&encode=0&proxy=&find_1=&replace_1=&target=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&scope=site&db=edb&AN=94922912&authtype=sso&custid=ns315887.
APA
Miller, R. T. (2013). Inefficient Results in the Market for Corporate Control: Highest Bidders, Highest-Value Users, and Socially Optimal Owners. Journal of Corporation Law, 39(1), 71–128.
Chicago
Miller, Robert T. 2013. “Inefficient Results in the Market for Corporate Control: Highest Bidders, Highest-Value Users, and Socially Optimal Owners.” Journal of Corporation Law 39 (1): 71–128. http://widgets.ebscohost.com/prod/customlink/proxify/proxify.php?count=1&encode=0&proxy=&find_1=&replace_1=&target=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&scope=site&db=edb&AN=94922912&authtype=sso&custid=ns315887.