Moral hazards and solar radiation management: Evidence from a large-scale online experiment.

Solar radiation management (SRM) may help to reduce the negative outcomes of climate change by minimising or reversing global warming. However, many express the worry that SRM may pose a moral hazard, i.e., that information about SRM may lead to a reduction in climate change mitigation efforts. In this paper, we report a large-scale preregistered, money-incentivised, online experiment with a representative US sample (N = 2284). We compare actual behaviour (donations to climate change charities and clicks on climate change petition links) as well as stated preferences (support for a carbon tax and self-reported intentions to reduce emissions) between participants who receive information about SRM with two control groups (a salience control that includes information about climate change generally and a content control that includes information about a different topic). Behavioural choices are made with an earned real-money endowment, and stated preference responses are incentivised via the Bayesian Truth Serum. We fail to find a significant impact of receiving information about SRM and, based on equivalence tests, we provide evidence in favour of the absence of a meaningfully large effect. Our results thus provide evidence for the claim that there is no detectable moral hazard with respect to SRM. • Informs an important policy issue: dissemination of information about solar radiation management, a geoengineering option. • Adopts best practices: includes salience control and content control conditions in a large-scale, well-powered experiment. • Tests both stated preferences and behavioural choices. • Finds no statistically significant effect for moral hazard. • Uses TOST to find evidence for a null effect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]