Technology spillover and market competitiveness in green credit induced corporate green innovation: An evolutionary game theory and empirical study.

For corporate green innovation, green credit (GC) policy has been increasingly crucial. However, technology spillover and market competitiveness in GC induced green innovation are unclear. We evaluate the influence and pathways of GC on corporate green innovation from both theoretical and empirical perspectives by developing a tripartite evolutionary game with banks, leaders, and followers, and meanwhile employing the difference-in-differences model. The tripartite evolutionary game demonstrates that the systematic equilibrium balance where banks issuing GC and leaders and followers engaging in green innovation will progressively be achieved. Empirical results are as follows. First, the GC indeed promotes corporate green innovation but primarily focuses on incremental innovation rather than radical innovation, indicating enterprises' strategic innovation to cater for GC. Second, whereas the positive impact of GC on incremental innovation is mediated by technology spillover, radical innovation is unaffected. However, the GC does not promote green innovation through market competitiveness. Finally, non-third-party-certified firms and large firms are more positively impacted by GC on incremental innovation. • We theoretically and empirically explore technology spillover and market competitiveness in GC induced corporate green innovation. • The GC promotes incremental innovation rather than radical innovation, indicating enterprises' strategic innovation. • The positive impact of GC on incremental innovation is mediated by technology spillover but radical innovation is unaffected. • The GC does not promote green innovation through market competitiveness. • Non-third-party-certified firms and state-owned firms are more positively impacted by GC. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]