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The Bertrand equilibrium in a price competition game.
- Source :
- Advances in Mathematical Economics (9784431308980); 2006, p449-465, 17p
- Publication Year :
- 2006
-
Abstract
- In my recent study, I have developed a Bertrand-Edgeworth game in which the price and the allocation identical to those in a long-run competitive equilibrium can be supported as a Nash equilibrium even if the number of sellers is small. Because that study focuses on markets with free entry, it has not directly examined the Bertrand-Edgeworth debate, concerning a market without free entry. Focusing on such a market, the present study demonstrates that the standard Bertrand equilibrium can be supported as a Nash equilibrium in Yano’s game. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISBNs :
- 9784431308980
- Database :
- Supplemental Index
- Journal :
- Advances in Mathematical Economics (9784431308980)
- Publication Type :
- Book
- Accession number :
- 26350816
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1007/4-431-30899-719