Functional and Causal Analysis in Parsons' Theory of Action.

The concept of function is generally regarded as a core methodological device of Parsonian action theory. "It is … entirely indispensable in sociology," as Parsons noted in one of his late programmatic essays. Instead of the label structural-functionalism he would prefer the more accurate expression "functional analysis" as suggested by Robert Merton. It was both the intellectual movement that criticized Parsons - frequently as an "arch-functionalist" - as well as the one seeking a positive reevaluation of his legacy known under the label of "neo-functionalism" that took the centrality of the concept of function for granted. This obvious common sense is contrasted by the fact that there is little explicit discussion and no systematic treatment of functional methodology in sociology. The major part of arguments pro and contra functionalism is developed around substantial assumptions in action theory such as the place of "values" or "norms" as opposed to "interests", of culture as opposed to economy, of consensus as opposed to conflict, or of supposed political implication such as an allegedly conservative strand etc. All these arguments do not touch the question of functional methodology as such. This paper aims to reconstruct the largely implicit assumptions of functionalism and argues in line with Parsons for its indispensable status for a theory of action. On the whole, functional analysis is taken as an important tool to overcome a naïve concept of causality and, consequently, a mechanistic understanding of action, particularly of the interconnectedness of action systems, their subsystems, and their respective environments. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]