The Marketing Channel Alliance Formation Mechanism Based on Asymmetric Information Games Model.

Based on an asymmetric information games model, this paper analyzed the marketing channel alliance formation mechanism under the condition of asymmetric information. Through calculating the expected revenue and expected loss of both sides during the process of game, it discussed the formation mechanism and subsidiary strategy of marketing channel alliance and put forward a mechanism that subsidiary would change the choice of game. The result is that if the formation of marketing alliance is not profitable to the manufacturer when he does not know the distributor's type, he will not choose marketing channel alliance and if it is profitable to him then he will choose. It is helpful to the distributor when the manufacturer provides sufficient product, but the probability for the manufacturer to provide sufficient product is improved only when his investment proportion is improved in the alliance. Therefore, if the distributor can compensate the manufacturer's loss, it will change the behavior of the manufacturer. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]