Incentivizing EVs to Provide Frequency Regulation Services by Aggregative Game-Based Mechanism

The proliferation of electric vehicles (EVs) provides a promising resource for regulation services to maintain the frequency of power systems. However, two major problems hinder its implementation, including the inaccuracy of the EV charging model and the overlook of varieties in EV ownership. To facilitate real-world implementation, this paper tailors a market-based mechanism to incentivize EVs to provide frequency regulation services. Firstly, a detailed EV charging model considering the battery equivalent circuit and AC-DC conversion loss is proposed. The nonconvexities are approximated and convexified with accuracy guarantee. Then, based on the self-interest behavior of EVs, a non-cooperative game is adopted to model the competition in providing frequency regulation service. The aggregative game is used to approximate the original non-cooperative game. Thereby, the existence, uniqueness, and approximation accuracy of the aggregative equilibrium is theoretically proved. Moreover, the rolling look-ahead iterative frequency regulation service clearing mechanism for EV parking lot is designed based on the decentralized equilibrium searching algorithm of the aggregative game. Finally, the effectiveness, computational efficiency, and approximation accuracy of the proposed market-based mechanism are validated by a series of numerical tests with EV populations at 50, 100, 200, 300, 600, and 900.