Dworkin além da metafísica e do ceticismo = Dworkin beyond the metaphysics and scepticism

This article starts in the existence or not of justice in personal preferences and in the content of the rules of law. It examines the response of legal idealistic philosophies, specifically, the philosophy of Plato, according to which, there is a metaphysically correct answer for each legal issue. It analyzes the response of skeptical philosophies, specifically the skeptical point of Erasmus of Rotterdam in “Praise of Folly”, according to which, naturalistic responses are results of arbitrary actions that not even the philosopher escapes. It also identifies the influences of skepticism in the political and legal philosophies, as the political realism by Machiavelli and the Legal Positivism. Our research notes the paradox that both platonism and skepticism start from the same conception of truth that is used to criticize human conduct and the contents in the rules of law. It exposes the legal theory of Ronald Dworkin, for which there is rationality and criteria to criticize besides metaphysical entities. This article begins in the comparison of philosophical ideas to achieve the objective of demonstrating the relevance of political tradition in Dworkin.