Security threats of satellite navigation receivers

Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receivers are the cornerstone of several modern systems: from smartphones to military applications. Therefore, their security is of utmost importance. This Master Thesis performs a security assessment on Septentrio's AsteRx-m3 receiver on two planes: a penetration testing engagement with the receiver's interfaces, and a GPS L1 C/A signal spoofing project. The assessment is satisfactory and distinct vulnerabilities are found on the web interface of the receiver, raging from low to high severity. On the GPS signal side, the Software Defined Radio used to carry out the spoofing is the HackRF One and the false GPS L1 C/A signal is generated using the software GPS-SDR-SIM. At first, the receiver detects the HackRF One signal Code-Carrier Divergence and repudiates the signal. After identifying and describing the problem, a fix is correctly implemented and, finally, the AsteRx-m3 receiver is successfully spoofed.