Swinburne's argument from consciousness

In The Existence of God, the second book in his trilogy on issues in philosophical theology, Richard Swinburne presents a sequence of inductive arguments for God's existence.1 In this paper I try to refute one interesting but hitherto overlooked member of this sequence, viz., "The Argument From Consciousness."2 Here is the plan I follow. Section I is a brief characterization of the general program Swinburne adopts in The Existence of God: I describe therein his overarching goal, define what he calls "C" and "P" inductive arguments, give a roughand-ready account of his terminology, and cite certain of his presuppositions. Section II contains an explicit version of the argument from consciousness, and a rough summary of the attack I bring against it. In HI I begin this attack: I search for but fail to find a needed sub-argument for a premise in the argument presented in II. But instead of ending this section with a rejection of Swinburne's argument, I postpone a decision about the truth or falsity of the premise he apparently doesn't support. In IV I sketch a theory of events, and then use that theory to develop with tolerable precision what Swinburne calls the "Mind-Brain Identity Theory." In V I consider and ultimately reject Swinburne's arguments against this theory. But then I assume, for the sake of argument, that Swinburne's attack on the Mind-Brain Identity Theory succeeds. I proceed to show, in VI, that his argument from consciousness fails even under this assumption. In VII, the final section, I briefly summarize my refutation, and then offer a few suggestions for building a stronger version of Swinburne's argument.