The Definition of Religion

INTERPRET my invitation to address the American Academy of Religion on the definition of its key concept, religion, as an opportunity to exercise several of what I believe to be my philosophical responsibilities. In this paper I reject, therefore, the currently popular view of the philosopher as technician, restricted in his proper function to the clarification of linguistic meanings. This technical role is indeed one of my important responsibilities, but the "love of wisdom" involves far more than technique. In what follows three sections correspond to my three primary aims for this occasion. First, I have an apologetic aim: to defend the very enterprise of definition-making, particularly the enterprise of defining religion, against several significant criticisms. Second, I have a constructive and critical aim: to sketch out a definition of religion, briefly explain it, test it, and show some of its uses. And third, I have a frankly hortatory aim: I want what I say to make a fruitful difference, both among inquirers in the fields concerned with religion and outside them. I intend, therefore, to close with an appeal to this body to take a vitally required initiative in ending the present state of conceptual chaos engulfing studies about religion.