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Can Bureaucrats Really Be Paid Like Ceos? Substitution between Incentives and Resources among School Administrators in China
- Publisher :
- Oxford University Press
-
Abstract
- Unlike performance incentives for private sector managers, little is known about performance incentives for managers in public sector bureaucracies. Through a randomized trial in rural China, we study performance incentives rewarding school administrators for reducing student anemia - as well as complementarity between incentives and orthogonally assigned discretionary resources. Large (but not small) incentives and unrestricted grants both reduced anemia, but incentives were more cost-effective. Although unrestricted grants and small incentives do not interact, grants fully crowd-out the effect of larger incentives. Our findings suggest that performance incentives can be effective in bureaucratic environments, but they are not complementary to discretionary resources.
- Subjects :
- 1. No poverty
TheoryofComputation_GENERAL
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Details
- Language :
- English
- Database :
- OpenAIRE
- Accession number :
- edsair.doi...........161856b4da61efbcce51d661fd0217f5