The Hegelian state and International polities

It is a characteristic of political theory and international politics that certain well worn stereotypes are perennially wheeled out for generations of students. Some of these may be useful landmarks for scholarship, others offer only partial insights. This paper addresses one of these stereotypes which does not dissolve with more intensive study. It attaches to the Hegelian concept of the state in relation to international politics. I refer to the view that Hegel's concept of the state, elaborated in the Philosophy of Right, is the final unit of analysis for any theory of international politics;1 that it is impossible to go beyond the nation state; that it possesses a finality in that international affairs are only to be understood through the relation between nation states. One of the conclusions which is sometimes drawn from this stereotype is that Hegel's account of international politics is Hobbesian in character; that is to say, the relation between states is rather like that between individuals in Hobbes' state of nature. The ruling principle would thus be that 'clubs are trumps' ; or, more conveniently, that might is right. For an Hegelian there cannot be a legitimate concept of international order, because order only exists in the individual state. Each state has its own legal system and concept of right, therefore the relationship between states is simply the conflict of rights. To put this in a moral perspective: states are neither right nor wrong; this is simply how things are. This has often led to the paradoxical conclusion that Hegel is a realist as regards international affairs, though perhaps a better term would be 'idealist-realist'. The aim of this paper is to examine the arguments for and against such a stereotype. The caricature presented above has a great deal of truth to it. There is an impressive body of arguments which can be marshalled in its support. However, what is often not realized is that there is a body of arguments which can show us a contrary perspective. Paradoxically, both sets of arguments can be supported from Hegel's existing writings. A similar ambiguity can be found in some of the writings of his disciples. This paper will attempt to marshall the arguments on both sides as clearly as possible. The cases are overall fairly evenly balanced; however, I will argue that ultimately the most consistent Hegelian position will