Plato’s Objects-Based Epistemology

When we read Plato’s epistemology—both the Republic’s powers argument and other texts—without in any way trying to avoid a Distinct Objects interpretation, we find ample evidence not only for that interpretation, but also for a stronger one. First, cognitive powers and their accomplishments are individuated by their objects. Second, cognitive powers and their accomplishments are defined by their objects: it is the objects that make them what they are (section 2). Finally, cognitive accomplishments—understood as occurrent cognitions—inherit their character from their objects: cognition works on the principle Aristotle calls “like-by-like.” Thus Plato’s epistemology is thoroughly objects-based. Epistêmê is, in essence, the kind of thing one can have only in relation to a special kind of object; doxa is, in its essence, the kind of thing one can have only in relation to a different special kind of object