Does International Law Promote the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes? Evidence from the Study of Territorial Conflicts since 1945

In this article, we explain the role of international law in the resolution of territorial disputes from 1945 to 2000. In doing so, we focus on three outcomes of interest. First, when do states choose to revise the territorial status quo through negotiations instead of force? Second, when are states able to reach a final settlement? Third, when do states prefer a process of legal dispute resolution (i.e., adjudication or arbitration) to bilateral negotiations? To answer these questions, we argue that when the legal principles relevant to the dispute are unambiguous and clearly favor one side, a law-based focal point will emerge. This focal point, in turn, facilitates the settlement process by helping leaders overcome distribution problems, a central obstacle in reaching a final agreement. We find strong and consistent empirical support for our hypotheses regarding international law and peaceful dispute resolution. I s a legal advantage an important source of bargaining leverage for state leaders as they negotiate over security issues in international disputes? Does international law provide the foundation for the peaceful settlement of security-related disputes? In a system defined by anarchy, there are reasons to question whether international law can play a central role in the orderly and peaceful resolution of disputes when security issues are at stake for leaders. Indeed, many would argue that the shadow of military power is an ever-present influence over such bargaining processes and that international law is, therefore, not a viable substitute for military strength and credible threats of force to secure the peace. As a result, although law may have an important role to play in governing international economic relations (e.g., Goldstein, Rivers, and Tomz 2007; Simmons and Hopkins 2005; von Stein 2005; Zangl 2008), where the parties will often have strong incentives to coordinate their behavior, the role of law in settling disagreements over security-related issues is a far more contentious question among scholars and policy makers. In such situations, leaders will often have divergent preferences over how the issue should be resolved, making the identification of a mutually acceptable solution difficult. The security aspect of the dispute compounds this problem because leaders will be reluctant to sign any agreement that they believe might decrease