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Value, Reason and Hedonism
- Source :
- Utilitas. 20:50-58
- Publication Year :
- 2008
- Publisher :
- Cambridge University Press (CUP), 2008.
-
Abstract
- It is widely believed that we always have reason to maximize the good. Utilitarianism and other consequentialist theories depend on this ‘teleological’ conception of value. Scanlon has argued that this view of value is not generally correct, but that it is most plausible with regard to the value of pleasure, and may even be true at least of that. But there are reasons to think that even the value of pleasure is not teleological.
Details
- ISSN :
- 17416183 and 09538208
- Volume :
- 20
- Database :
- OpenAIRE
- Journal :
- Utilitas
- Accession number :
- edsair.doi...........c19b8b91fa7e636676533fe0aaaf58fa
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820807002890