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Value, Reason and Hedonism

Authors :
Alison Hills
Source :
Utilitas. 20:50-58
Publication Year :
2008
Publisher :
Cambridge University Press (CUP), 2008.

Abstract

It is widely believed that we always have reason to maximize the good. Utilitarianism and other consequentialist theories depend on this ‘teleological’ conception of value. Scanlon has argued that this view of value is not generally correct, but that it is most plausible with regard to the value of pleasure, and may even be true at least of that. But there are reasons to think that even the value of pleasure is not teleological.

Details

ISSN :
17416183 and 09538208
Volume :
20
Database :
OpenAIRE
Journal :
Utilitas
Accession number :
edsair.doi...........c19b8b91fa7e636676533fe0aaaf58fa
Full Text :
https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820807002890