Aiding Data-Driven Attack Model with a Compiler Modification

In previous chapter, we presented a data-driven acoustic attack model. However, in the previous attack model, an attacker may be far from being able to completely reconstruct the G/M-code due to lack of enough information leakage through the side-channels. In this chapter, we present a novel way to amplify the information leakage and thus boost the chances of recovery of G/M-code by surreptitiously altering the compiler. By using this compiler, an adversary may easily control various parameters to magnify the leakage of information from a 3D printer while still producing the desired object, thus remaining hidden from the authentic users. This type of attack may be implemented by strong attackers having access to the tool chain and seeking high level of stealth. We present an implementation of such a compiler here and demonstrate how it can increase the success rate of recovering G/M-codes from the four side-channels (acoustic, power, vibration, and electromagnetic) by up to 39% compared to previously proposed data-driven attack model.