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Federal banking regulators' competition in laxity: Evidence from CRA audits
- Source :
- International Advances in Economic Research. 4:56-69
- Publication Year :
- 1998
- Publisher :
- Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 1998.
-
Abstract
- The U.S. banking industry has three federal regulators in addition to the 50 state regulators. Through choices regarding its chartering source, joining the Federal Reserve System, and having deposit insurance, a bank also selects which office or agency serves as its primary regulator. Federal regulators gain status and authority from the number of banks over which they have primary supervision. It has long been suspected, therefore, that they compete with each other to entice banks to make choices that increase the number of banks reporting to them. This competition which includes less stringent enforcement and broad interpretation of the laws as favored by the banks is known as competition in laxity. The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) is enforced by each of the three federal banking regulators. Since 1990, their ratings of banks' CRA performance have been published. This published data provides an opportunity to test accuracy of the competition in laxity theory.
- Subjects :
- Finance
Economics and Econometrics
business.industry
media_common.quotation_subject
Audit
Test (assessment)
Competition (economics)
State (polity)
Agency (sociology)
Economics
Community Reinvestment Act
Deposit insurance
business
Enforcement
General Economics, Econometrics and Finance
media_common
Subjects
Details
- ISSN :
- 1573966X and 10830898
- Volume :
- 4
- Database :
- OpenAIRE
- Journal :
- International Advances in Economic Research
- Accession number :
- edsair.doi...........edd64b5dc3345624f3828c5b0961fa9a
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02295236