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Toeholds and Takeovers
- Publication Year :
- 1996
-
Abstract
- (forthcoming Journal of Political Economy). Part ownership of a takeover target can help a bidder win a takeover auction, often at a low price. A bidder with a "toehold" bids aggressively in a standard ascending auction because its offers are both bids for the remaining shares and asks for its own holdings. While the direct effect of a toehold on a bidder's strategy may be small, the indirect effect is large in a common value auction. When a firm bids more aggressively, its competitors face an increased winner's curse and must bid more conservatively. This allows the toeholder to bid more aggressively still, and so on. One implication is that a controlling minority shareholder may be immune to outside offers. The board of a target may increase the expected sale price by allowing a second bidder to buy a toehold on favorable terms, or by running a sealed bid auction.
- Subjects :
- TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUS
Economics and Econometrics
Creditor
TheoryofComputation_GENERAL
jel:D44
jel:G30
toeholds, takeovers, auctions, mergers,corporate acquisitions, footholds, winner's curse, common value auctions
Bidding
jel:G34
Microeconomics
Auctions
Common Value Auctions
Corporate Acquisitions
Footholds
Mergers
Takeovers
Toeholds
Winner's Curse
Shareholder
Bankruptcy
Winner's curse
Value (economics)
Toeholds, Takeovers, Auctions, Mergers, Corporate Acquisitions, Footholds, Winner's Curse, Common Value Auctions
Common value auction
Business
Subjects
Details
- Database :
- OpenAIRE
- Accession number :
- edsair.doi.dedup.....0a1b0e425f7bf48a4fa2a05487e3072c