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Why are the French so different from the Germans? Underpricing of IPOs on the Euro New Markets

Authors :
Luc Renneboog
Arif Khurshed
Marc Goergen
Source :
Goergen, M, Khurshed, A & Renneboog, L 2009, ' Why are the French so different from the Germans? Underpricing of IPOs on the Euro New Markets ', International Review of Law and Economics, vol. 29, no. 3, pp. 260-271 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2009.02.006
Publication Year :
2009
Publisher :
Elsevier, 2009.

Abstract

IPOs on the EuroNMs have shown very high underpricing.The majority of these IPOs possess specific characteristics such as lock-up agreements, venture-capital financing, ownership by the underwriter and over-allotment options.We study how these characteristics influence the underpricing of firms listed on the two largest EuroNM stock exchanges, the Neuer Markt of Germany and the Nouveau Marche of France.We find that the high underpricing in these two markets contrary to the evidence on the US - is not driven by insiders selling behaviour.However, the large underpricing is caused by the high degree of riskiness of the issuing firms and by the partial adjustment phenomenon of offer prices to compensate institutional investors for the truthful revelation of their demand for the shares.In contrast, venture-capital involvement does not affect underpricing.For France, lock-up agreements act as substitutes to underpricing, but not so for Germany.We also explore the reasons for the large difference in underpricing between the German and the French IPOs: German firms are more underpriced because they are more risky, have larger price revisions, have less stringent VC lock-up contracts and mostly go public during the hot issue period of 1999-2000 when the general level of underpricing in all IPO markets is substantially higher.

Details

Database :
OpenAIRE
Journal :
Goergen, M, Khurshed, A & Renneboog, L 2009, ' Why are the French so different from the Germans? Underpricing of IPOs on the Euro New Markets ', International Review of Law and Economics, vol. 29, no. 3, pp. 260-271 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2009.02.006
Accession number :
edsair.doi.dedup.....129dcc59652a11f914d3061dd5b49e94
Full Text :
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2009.02.006