Discovering Logical Vulnerabilities in the Wi-Fi Handshake Using Model-Based Testing

We use model-based testing techniques to detect logical vulnerabilities in implementations of the Wi-Fi handshake. This reveals new fingerprinting techniques, multiple downgrade attacks, and Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerabilities. Stations use the Wi-Fi handshake to securely connect with wireless networks. In this handshake, mutually supported capabilities are determined, and fresh pairwise keys are negotiated. As a result, a proper implementation of the Wi-Fi handshake is essential in protecting all subsequent traffic. To detect the presence of erroneous behaviour, we propose a model-based technique that generates a set of representative test cases. These tests cover all states of the Wi-Fi handshake, and explore various edge cases in each state. We then treat the implementation under test as a black box, and execute all generated tests. Determining whether a failed test introduces a security weakness is done manually. We tested 12 implementations using this approach, and discovered irregularities in all of them. Our findings include fingerprinting mechanisms, DoS attacks, and downgrade attacks where an adversary can force usage of the insecure WPA-TKIP cipher. Finally, we explain how one of our downgrade attacks highlights incorrect claims made in the 802.11 standard. ispartof: pages:360-371 ispartof: Proceedings of the 12th ACM SIGSAC Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security (AsiaCCS 2017) pages:360-371 ispartof: ACM SIGSAC Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security (AsiaCCS 2017) location:Abu Dhabi, UAE date:2 Apr - 6 Apr 2017 status: published