Stability analysis of supply chain in evolutionary game based on stability theory of nonlinear differential equation

Based on the stability theory of nonlinear differential equation, this paper analyzes the stability of the evolutionary game supply chain, and obtains the strategies that both sides should adopt in different situations. In this paper, aiming at the problem of various random interference factors in the attack and defense game system, the concept of Gauss white noise is used for reference, and it o random differential equation is used to establish the random attack and defense evolution game model. The influence of various random interference factors such as system environment and strategy change on the selection and evolution of attack and defense strategy is analyzed. According to the stability discrimination theorem of stochastic differential equation, the stability of attack and defense strategy is analyzed. In addition, a security strategy selection algorithm based on evolutionary game model of random attack and defense is designed. The results show that under different conditions, there is a unique evolutionary stable strategy in the attack and defense game system.